Tutorial: Improving the transient immunity of your microcontroller-based embedded design - Part 1
Defining the problem: A step by step tutorial on EMI, ESD, and EFT problems in embedded designs and a range of possible solutions.
By Ross Carlton, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
When it comes to protecting their designs from a variety of transient
electrical disturbances, developers of microcontroller-based embedded
systems in consumer, industrial, and automotive electronics are caught
between the rock and the hard place.
On the one hand, more sophisticated and noise-sensitive
microcontrollers (MCUs), with high
integration, tighter process requirements and lower voltage
requirements are moving into designs that are increasingly hazardous
with respect to electromagnetic
interference (EMI) and electrostatic
discharge (ESD).
On the other, increased competition, as well as market regulatory
pressures, are forcing original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to
reduce the cost of their products. As a result of this focus on cost
control, implementing the necessary transient
immunity protections to
prevent application malfunction due to
transients on power and signal lines is becoming ever more challenging.
The impact of increasing MCU sensitivity and low-cost application
design is being felt in all markets: consumer, industrial, automotive,
etc. While there are significant differences in the design and use of
products for these markets, the susceptibilities induced in all
microcontroller-based applications are essentially the same. Typical
susceptibilities include unexpected state changes on input pins (reset,
interrupt request, or general purpose inputs), corruption of on-chip
clock signals, or even damage to the silicon.
The pervasive impact of EMI
and ESD transients
In consumer electronics applications,
transient immunity is a challenge for both battery powered and AC mains
powered products. Battery powered products such as keyboards, mice,
remote keyless entry systems, and remote controls are challenged by
ensuring the immunity of the application to ESD transients.
For example, an ESD directly to the product or to a nearby coupling
plane has been seen to assert the reset function of an MCU by
temporarily changing the state of the RESET pin. In these cases, there
is typically a long trace between the RESET pin and an in-circuit
programming header that serves as an antenna to receive the ESD energy
and couple it to the RESET pin.
Likewise, an electrical fast
transient (EFT) injected on the AC power plug of an AC mains
powered product can couple to a reset trace by either radiation or
conduction resulting in susceptibility. Self-compatibility is also of
great concern where the product contains inductive loads (motors,
compressors, etc) that are switched.
Since electronics for industrial
applications is typically powered only from the AC mains, they
have similar issues to those of consumer electronics products powered
from the AC mains. However, these issues are typically more severe than
in residential applications due to the presence of heavy machinery
(large inductive loads) switching on and off the power distribution
system for the factory.
The transient immunity issues in automotive
electronics applications are also similar to consumer
electronics applications except for being powered by DC mains. This is
because automobiles contain numerous switching inductive loads
(alternator, compressor, solenoids, etc) that put transients on the DC
mains. In addition, automotive applications are becoming increasing
concerned with ESD.
For example, a new application for MCUs is in remote tire pressure
monitoring systems (TPMS). This is a novel innovation but introduces
new ESD immunity issues. ESD near a TPMS device has been seen to cause
both upset and damage. Since it is almost impossible to ensure that an
automotive technician uses and ESD wrist strap, TPMS and other
automotive electronics can easily be exposed to ESD in the ±25
kV range during maintenance operations. For reference, commercial
electronics are typically required to be immune to ESD in the ±8
kV range.
To meet the transient immunity challenge as traditional power supply
designs and EMI controls are sacrificed for lower cost solutions, the
embedded systems designers must employ new techniques and processes to
meet the applicable regulatory and market requirements for electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC).
Achieving transient immunity in a low-cost embedded application can
be a difficult and time-consuming process, particularly if not
addressed early and often in the design of an application. In addition,
making the mistake of not addressing transient protection as close to
the AC or DC mains as possible will also adversely affect the
complexity of EMC protection. The initial design of an embedded
application should maximize EMC so that design budgets and production
schedules are met without delays at the EMC compliance stage.
However, there are practical hardware design techniques that can be
employed to provide cost-effective protection for EFT,
ESD and other power line or signal line transients of short duration.
In addition, the EFT or ESD performance of a system can be dramatically
affected by the choices made in the software architecture and
application functionality.
Software techniques should be viewed as a necessary but last line of
defense against adverse system reaction to EFT or ESD events. The
software can affect how the system will react to a disturbance if it
reaches the MCU but the hardware PCB
board and system hardware
design should diminish or eliminate
the disturbance before it reaches the MCU.
Prioritizing the control of transient voltages and currents with
hardware techniques is also important from the aspect of minimizing
exposure of electrical and electronic components to over-specification
conditions that could result in accelerated failure rates or long-term
degradation.
Defining the problem
Low cost, microcontroller-based embedded applications are particularly
susceptible to performance degradation during ESD and EFT events. This
sensitivity to fast rise time transients is to be expected, even for
microcontrollers running at relatively low clock frequencies.
This sensitivity is due to the process technologies employed.
Today's semiconductor process technologies for low-cost, 8-bit and
16-bit MCUs implement transistor gate lengths in the 0.65?m to 0.25??m
range. These gate lengths are capable of generating and responding to
signals with rise times in the sub-nanosecond range (or an equivalent
bandwidth of greater than 300MHz). As a result, an MCU is quite capable
of responding to ESD or EFT signals injected onto its pins.
In addition to the process technology, MCU performance in the
presence of an ESD or EFT event is affected by the design of the IC and
its package, the design of the printed circuit board (PCB), the
software running on the MCU, the design of the system, and the
characteristics of the ESD or EFT waveform when it reaches the MCU. The
relative impact of each performance driver (where to focus effort for
maximum effect) is shown in the pie chart in Figure 1, below.
 |
| Figure
1. Performance driver impact on transient immunity |
Several facets of IC design other than physical gate length can
affect MCU performance during transients. These include the composition
of ESD suppression devices on input/output (I/O) pins and the layout of
I/O pin structures. ESD devices range from simple diodes to complex
active filters. Power supply rejection is accomplished through internal
capacitance and careful routing on the die. Physical separation of pin
inputs from active circuitry is a proven method to reduce transient
effects but at a greater cost penalty due to die size impact.
The choice of MCU package can also affect immunity performance. The
package type can have a great influence on PCB layout and composition.
Surface-mount MCUs generally have smaller footprints than through-hole
packages. This can reduce overall PCB dimensions and increase routing
density, but it can also provide more space to implement board-level
suppression techniques.
Areas of MCU Vulnerability
Considering that most MCUs are specified and designed to generate and
respond to signals with rise times comparable to ESD and EFT events,
vulnerability to these events should be expected. Areas of MCUs
typically vulnerable to ESD and EFT stresses include:
1) Power and ground pins
2) Edge sensitive digital inputs
3) High frequency digital
inputs
4) Analog inputs
5) Clock (oscillator) pins
6) Substrate injection
7) General purpose I/O (GPIO) with multiplexed pin functions
8) ESD protection circuitry
Some MCUs have multiple power and ground pins to isolate high speed
digital functions from low speed or noisy analog functions. These
supply pins should be filtered appropriately to prevent disturbances in
one area from affecting another.
Low cost MCUs may only have a single set of power and ground pins,
which makes isolation difficult, and makes filtering more important. It
is easy to understand that a transient that gets propagated to a supply
line can also disrupt internal circuitry that has no direct route to
the pin that was disturbed.
Edge sensitive inputs are particularly vulnerable to transients.
These inputs are usually timer or external interrupt inputs. Even with
external low pass filtering a sufficiently large pulse can inject
enough energy into the input area to disrupt MCU operation. Pulses that
don't disrupt the MCU can still be seen as glitches by the MCU. (A
software technique to filter out glitches is discussed later in this
series).
 |
| Figure
2. Transient generation of logic glitches |
High speed digital inputs, such as clock and data inputs, are less
likely to have low pass filtering
and consequently can register transients as valid data pulses (see Figure 2, above). External
isolation techniques are necessary to eliminate this vulnerability.
Analog inputs are generally lower impedance than digital inputs and
can suffer physical damage if not protected during ESD and EFT
transients. However, on most MCUs the analog inputs are multiplexed
with general purpose I/O pins and have a small sampling window in which
the lower input impedance is active. A transient appearing in an analog
input pin during an analog to digital conversion will result in
distorted data due to the signal disruption. Effective software
filtering techniques exist to mitigate this vulnerability.
Most MCUs have a built-in oscillator amplifier so that an external
crystal or resonator is all that is needed to ensure a stable high
frequency system clock. The oscillator pins can pass noise pulses as
valid clock edges and are considered to be the most vulnerable inputs
to the system. Appropriate PCB layout is the preferred method to
eliminate this risk.
 |
| Figure
3. Transient current injection paths inside the MCU |
As shown in Figure 3 above,
transients can travel from the point of entry and affect circuits via
several paths. System input signals that exceed the power rails of the
MCU will inject current into the I/O pin structure as soon as the
signal level exceeds the ESD protection diode's forward voltage.
The I/O pin structure and on chip ESD protection network can
dissipate small amounts of injected energy. However, if the injected
current is greater than the local circuit can handle, this excessive
current can find alternate paths through the supply rails or substrate
to disrupt other circuitry. Current injection is generally minimized by
using series resistors.
General purpose MCUs have I/O ports that can have more that one
function multiplexed on a single pin. An electrical disturbance that
causes enough energy to disrupt digital logic can also affect the
control circuitry that selects the pin function. The resulting fault
could change the pin state, the pin directionality, or the pin
function.
Vulnerability is particularly troublesome for general purpose MCUs
that are designed to meet the needs of many applications. For these
MCUs, it is impractical or impossible to harden all vulnerable areas
without adversely affecting functional performance in at least some
applications.
Application-specific MCUs can be hardened with greater success, but
some vulnerability will continue to exist if the operational frequency
or bandwidth of the MCU overlaps the bandwidth of the ESD and EFT
signals.
MCU Immunity Performance
Classification
The immunity performance for integrated circuits is typically
classified into one of four categories as specified in IEC 62132-1 and shown in Table 1 below.
The classification applied is determined by the performance of the
integrated circuit in the presence of the disturbance signal (i.e the
ESD or EFT waveform). This performance is dependent on the type of
integrated circuit and its functional and parametric operation as
documented in its data sheet.
 |
| Table
1. Classification of IC EMC Degradation |
Class A
performance is the most desirable and is often required for
safety-critical applications. Of course, this level of performance is
difficult to ensure without taking proper steps in the design of the
application. This is because any transient appearing at a pin that can
be processed by the input circuitry has the potential for being
interpreted as data and corrupting program execution.
Class B
performance is considered acceptable for most applications where
the main requirement is for no user intervention to recover normal
performance. Class
C performance can be acceptable for particular
applications where operator intervention is not an issue, or where an
external watchdog or supervisory circuit is used. Class D performance
is not acceptable.
MCU Failure Modes
For MCUs, performance degradation can take many forms. Common forms of
temporary degradation include but are not limited to reset, latch-up,
memory corruption, and code runaway.
MCUs with internal reset circuits can generally resume operation
without operator involvement if the fault is an unexpected reset or
code runaway that is caught by a watchdog timer.
Recovery from latch-up and volatile memory (RAM, DRAM, etc.)
corruption requires cycling the power to the system. Non-volatile
memory (FLASH, EEPROM, ROM, etc.) corruption requires a more extensive
process of re-programming the system, which can be viewed as a
temporary MCU degradation if the system can be re-worked, or as a
permanent degradation if it cannot be re-worked.
Permanent degradation can include increased leakage current on I/O
pins which can affect analog measurements, input impedances, and output
drive strength. With increased leakage current, the electronic system
may still operate within specification for a while, but it may
ultimately fail due to damage from the transient stress. Another type
of permanent degradation found in transient environments is blown pins
due to an electrical overstress.
Impact of MCU Design Trends
The MCU design trend that particularly impacts transient immunity
performance is the drive to continually reduce the minimum gate length
of individual field effect
transistors (FETs), making them smaller and faster. This trend
is the result of market pressure on semiconductor manufacturers to
reduce the cost of their products by making die sizes smaller.
The result is that maintaining the immunity performance of MCUs in
the face of process technology advances is becoming increasingly
difficult. When coupled with continuing cost reductions by OEMs at the
application or system level, the immunity problem becomes severe.
MCU designers are challenged to develop better methods to dissipate
the energy injected during a transient event. While they would
appreciate more area in which to include transient suppression
circuits, this is generally not allowed in order to keep the die size
and cost to a minimum. Some of the remaining options available to the
designer include modifying semiconductor attributes (doping and
materials) and changing the vertical structure of the I/O pin.
Next in Part 2: Hardware Techniques
- The basic circuit building blocks
Ross Carlton has specialized in
all aspects of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) since his graduation
from Texas A&M University with a Bachelor of Science in Electrical
Engineering in 1985. He has been with Freescale Semiconductor for the
last eight years where he has led the EMC design, test and support of
Freescale's 8, 16, and 32-bit microcontroller products. In addition,
Ross represents the U.S. as a Technical Expert to IEC
Subcommittee 47A
on integrated circuits where he is the project leader for IEC 61967-2,
IEC 61967-3 and IEC 62132-2. He
is currently
involved in developing transient immunity test methodologies for
standardization.
The
author would like to thank Greg
Racino and John Suchyta, 8-Bit Applications Engineer at Freescale
Semiconductor for their
inputs and guidance. Their contributions were critical to
ensuring consistent and correct guidance.
References:
1. Ross Carlton, Greg Racino,
John Suchyta, Improving the Transient Immunity Performance of
Microcontroller-based applications. Freescale
Application Note (AN) 2764).
2. IEC 61000-4-2,
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 4-2: Testing and measurement
techniques - Electrostatic discharge immunity test, International
Electrotechnical Commission, 2001.
3. IEC 61000-4-4,
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) - Part 4-4: Testing and measurement
techniques - Electrical fast transient/burst immunity test,
International Electrotechnical Commission, 2001.
4. Ronald B. Standler,
Protection of Electronic Circuits from Overvoltages, John Wiley &
Sons, 1989, pp. 265-283.
5. Ken Kundert, "Power
Supply Noise Reduction", The Designer's Guide , 2004.
6. Larry D. Smith,
"Decoupling Capacitor Calculations for CMOS Circuits", Electrical
Performance of Electrical Packages Conference, Monterey CA,
November 1994, Pages 101-105.
7. Ronald B. Standler,
Protection of Electronic Circuits from Overvoltages, John Wiley &
Sons, 1989.
8. Clayton Paul, Introduction
to Electromagnetic Compatibility, Wiley & Sons, 1992.
9. Bernard Keiser,
Principles of Electromagnetic Compatibility, Artech House, 1987.
10. T.C. Lun, "Designing for
Board Level Electromagnetic Compatibility", Motorola
Application Note (AN) 2321.